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1THE INFLUENCE OF COCKPIT WEATHER
 AUTOMATION ON PILOT PERCEPTION
   AND DECISION-MAKING IN
    SEVERE WEATHER CONDITIONS
Kryn M. Ambs
Dr. Philip Tartalone, Mentor
ABSTRACT
This research examines situations in which a pilot either 
chooses to use, or refrains from using weather-related automation 
systems, and how the presence of such systems influences a pilot’s 
decision-making, performance and ability to perceive danger in 
severe weather conditions. Results indicate that the influence of 
automation on a pilot’s perception and decision-making process is 
dependent upon the pilot’s ability to perform manual flight tasks, 
independent of the automation. Pilots are more likely to continue 
flight into severe weather conditions and less likely to identify 
hazardous weather changes when an imbalance exists between a 
pilot’s flight experience, confidence in ability to manually operate 
the aircraft, and reliance on automation systems.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Reliance on advanced cockpit technologies, more 
specifically weather radar systems, has led researchers to 
question whether such technologies improve or hinder a pilot’s 
decision-making performance and ability to perceive danger in 
severe weather conditions. Madhavan and Lacson (2006) state 
that “poor pilot decision-making in deteriorating weather is the 
leading cause of a significant percentage of fatalities arising from 
aviation accidents in the last two decades” (p. 47). Although 
an appropriate level of training may have been completed, the 
presence of weather automation may enhance or hinder the pilot’s 
performance and decision-making process. High-tech cockpits 
integrate information quickly and efficiently, decreasing the pilot’s 
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2workload and the time it takes the pilot to make decisions. Thus, 
overreliance on automation, specifically weather automation 
systems, may increase erroneous behavior and ultimately lead 
to aircraft accidents. This research focuses on the pilot’s reliance 
on weather automation, versus the pilot’s ability to perform 
without weather automation, when assessing the safety of weather 
conditions and determining whether to continue flight. Mosier, 
Skitka, Heers, and Burdick (1998) indicated that although pilots 
are trained to use the systems of the aircraft, new technologies 
are being developed to take on cognitive flight tasks for the pilot. 
Concurrently, pilots who use automated weather systems have 
shown an overreliance on the data provided by these displays. 
These advancements have been proven to have a positive affect 
on a pilot’s performance and decision-making process; however, 
confusion pertaining to automation and weather displays has also 
been documented.
The article Performance Consequences of Automation-
Induced Complacency by Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh (1993) 
explained that one form of confusion, known as complacency, is 
“one potential negative effect of automation relevant to monitor-
ing performance” (p. 2).  Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh (1993) 
go on to explain that:
Crew attitudes such as overconfidence in 
automation may not be sufficient in themselves 
to lead to complacency, but may only indicate a 
potential for complacency. Complacent behavior 
may arise only when complacency potential oc-
curs jointly with other conditions such as high 
workload brought about by poor weather, heavy 
traffic, or fatigue due to poor sleep or long flights. 
The combination of the crew’s attitude toward 
automation (e.g., overreliance) and a particular 
situation (e.g., fatigue) may lead to complacent 
behavior. One index of complacent behavior 
(among other possibilities) could be reduced ac-
curacy or delay in detecting a failure in the auto-
mated control of a flight task. (p. 3) 
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3It can be determined that certain human factors or flying 
conditions (weather, traffic, fatigue, etc.) may cause pilots to rely 
more heavily on automated weather systems, in comparison to 
situations in which such human factors or conditions do not occur. 
Such confidence in weather displays may result in poor monitoring 
performance. While relying on the weather systems, pilots may 
neglect to monitor the systems for danger, malfunctions, or 
failure, which could ultimately lead to an incident or accident. It is 
important that an appropriate balance exists between the accuracy 
of the pilot’s performance and the reliance upon the accuracy of 
the automated weather systems. Muthard and Wickens (2003) 
recognize the limitations of some automated weather systems, 
noting that pilots were less likely to detect threatening weather 
changes and were therefore more likely to continue flying 
hazardous routes. They also found that “pilots would seek cues 
that confirm the belief that the originally filed flight path was safe 
and ignore cues that refute the belief” (Muthard & Wickens, 2003, 
p. 858). This is an indication of substantial reliance on weather 
automation and deficient information processing. Pilots who rely 
on already limited automation are more likely to continue flight 
into unsafe conditions, which increases the risk of erroneous 
behavior and the possibility of calamity.
In Humans and Automation: Use, Misuse, Disuse, Abuse, 
the relationship between pilots and automation is examined and 
further defined as the “engaging or disengaging, overreliance, ne-
glect, and omission of consequences of, or pertaining to automa-
tion” (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997, p. 230). When automation is 
implemented in flight operations, it is important that the system is 
easy to operate, responds quickly, and that proper training is re-
ceived to ensure its appropriate use and to reduce the risk of oper-
ator errors (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Parasuraman and Riley 
(1997) discuss the importance of the pilot’s ability to recognize 
an overreliance on automation and the tendency to use automa-
tion cues as heuristics for decisions. They report that “operational 
monitoring can be efficient” with favorable ergonomics, steady 
workloads, and a counterbalance between pilots and automation 
performance (p. 249). Furthermore, an operator’s mistrust of auto-
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4mation will decrease when the automation meets standard require-
ments for function. Equally, automation abuse will decrease when 
the operator has responsibilities and capabilities not solely based 
on the functions of the automation (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
Contrarily, a study by Moiser et al. (1998) reported that:
Pilots who reported an internalized perception of 
“accountability” for their performance and strate-
gies of interactions with the automation were signifi-
cantly more likely to double-check automated func-
tioning against other cues and less likely to commit 
errors than those who do not share this perception. 
Pilots were also likely to erroneously “remember” 
the presence of expected cues when describing their 
decision-making processes. (p. 47-48)
 These studies suggest that although some pilots maintain 
a balance between their ability to fly the aircraft and their reliance 
on automation, there are pilots who do not maintain this balance, 
relying solely on automation to complete cognitive flight tasks. 
The imbalance between flight experience and automation reliance 
identified in both of these studies documents the influence of au-
tomation on pilot perception and decision-making. Based on this 
research, the influence of automation can be positive or negative, 
depending on the pilot’s ability to assume responsibility for com-
pleting cognitive flight tasks, independent of automation. A study 
by Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) suggests that the presence of 
automation within the cockpit helps pilots make safe decisions 
and perform flight tasks correctly, in accordance with high-risk 
situations in which pilots make strategic decisions based on time 
and their ability to maintain personal control of the aircraft, as 
opposed to completing all flight tasks with a sole reliance on au-
tomation.  Furthermore, Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) report that:
    
(a) Different operators prefer to acquire informa-
tion using different heuristic-based strategies; (b) 
the selection of an information acquisition strategy 
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5is not predicted by task-related experience; (c) and 
the strategy that appears most appealing is also one 
that demands a significant amount of time to en-
sure that sufficient information is acquired prior to 
the selection of an alternative. Successful decision 
support systems are therefore likely to be those 
that enable users to exercise control over their own 
individual approach to decision making, and pres-
ent the required information within a time period 
that enable the generation and execution of a re-
sponse. (p. 745)
Wiggins and Bollwerk’s (2006) study examined pilot 
decision-making relative to perception and personal stimuli, 
with little dependency on weather automation. Similarly, a 
study by Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) examined pilot 
decision-making in severe weather conditions relative to weather 
encounters and available weather information. Wiegmann at al. 
(2002) reported that pilots who encountered severe weather early 
in a flight were more likely to “go take a look,” while pilots who 
experienced weather changes later in a flight were more likely 
to rely on their senses and personal experience before making a 
decision to diverge from their original flight plan. They further 
reported that these analyses were a result of situation assessment. 
Wiegmann et al. (2002) explained that early weather encounters 
influenced pilots to continue flight (or “go take a look”) due to 
a contradiction between prior weather briefing information and 
automated weather data. Furthermore, later weather encounters 
quickly influenced pilots to divert from the original flight plan 
due to the lack of accuracy and reliability of the previous weather 
briefing information.  
O’Hare and Smitheram (1995) report that “one of the most 
significant factors in general aviation fatalities is the continuance 
of visual flight rules (VFR) flight into deteriorating weather” (p. 
351). In “Human Factors Analysis of Accidents Involving Visual 
Flight Rules Flight into Adverse Weather,” Goh and Wiegmann 
(2002a) hypothesize that “pilots risk pressing on into deteriorat-
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6ing weather simply because they do not realize they are doing so” 
(p. 817).  In this study, Goh and Wiegmann (2002) also hypothesize 
that pilots may continue VFR flight into instrument meteorologi-
cal conditions (IMC) when they “are overconfident in their abilities 
and do not fully appreciate the risks of flying into adverse weather” 
(p. 817). Data support both hypotheses above, where pilots may be 
too confident or do not realize the deteriorating weather, ultimately 
leading to an incident or accident (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002a, p. 
821).  Goh and Wiegmann (2002a) report that: 
It was found that the median flight hours of pilots 
involved in VFR-IMC accidents was significant-
ly lower than that of pilots involved in other types 
of GA accidents. Pilots involved in VFR-IMC ac-
cidents had less training (certification) and were 
less likely to have instrument ratings.  Therefore, 
these pilots may have less experience interpreting 
real-time weather and may make more erroneous 
evaluations. (p. 821)   
Pilots appear to rely on automation, as well as their own 
ability to perceive danger, to complete cognitive flight tasks in 
high-risk situations; however, flight experience and familiarity of 
the automation significantly affect the outcome of a flight. Further 
research has identified how pilots apply decision-making to the 
performance of cognitive tasks in weather related situations with 
the use of automated weather systems. Latorella and Chamberlain 
(2002) evaluate pilots’ notion of tactical (to do, evaluate, maneuver, 
and control) and strategic (to plan, think, anticipate, prioritize) plan-
ning in severe weather, and report that “pilots need tactical weather 
information” (p. 105). Latorella and Chamberlin (2002) report that 
“subjects indicated that knowing cell intensities’ (colored graphics), 
proximity to weather (cell locations and aircraft location), and hav-
ing weather radar and observations for alternates and destinations 
supported tactical use” (p. 104).  This study indicates that although 
pilots can operate aircraft without tactical weather-related informa-
tion from weather radar systems, pilots need such information for 
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7better performance and safer decision-making. Without weather ra-
dar systems in the cockpit, a pilot may evaluate the safety of a flight 
using personal stimuli and knowledge to strategically plan a diver-
sion. However, with weather radar systems in the cockpit, a pilot is 
able to use both tactical and strategic planning to form a safer flight 
plan in critical situations.
A study by Beringer and Ball (2004) examines the effects 
of weather automation and direct weather viewing on a pilot’s 
perception and decision-making in severe weather. Thirty-two pi-
lots participated in this study, flying a simulator using NEXRAD 
weather radar, while visual-performance data, flight-performance 
data, and post-flight data were collected. Visual-performance data 
correspond to how long the pilots accessed the data; flight-per-
formance data correspond to how close to the weather the pilots 
flew, and how long they deferred the decision to continue flight; 
post-flight data correspond to the response of the pilots to weather 
data, equivalent to that of the simulator in a non-flight environ-
ment (Beringer & Ball, 2004). Data showed that:
Physical separation maintained from convective 
cells suggests that the pilots with higher resolu-
tion NEXRAD imagery or no NEXRAD imagery 
tended to fly closer to the convective cells than 
is recommended by the AIM (7-1-27). It recom-
mends “avoiding by at least 20 miles any thunder-
storm identified as severe or giving an intense ra-
dar echo.” Note that 17 (53.2%) of the pilots flew 
inside this recommended distance.  Additionally, 
the AIM (7-1-27) suggests not taking off or land-
ing in the face of an approaching thunderstorm and 
to not attempt to fly under the thunderstorm even 
if you can see through the other side. However, 7 
(21.9%) pilots attempted to fly through or under 
the thunderstorm to land. (p. 6)
Their results show that pilots exhibited both an overreli-
ance on weather automation and a deficient professional judgment 
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8while flying through severe weather conditions. When no weather 
automation is present, a pilot may still continue near or through 
inclement weather, without indication of the presence or severity 
of storm cells.  When weather automation with high resolution 
(indicating more accuracy) is present, the pilot may opt to con-
tinue flight near or through inclement weather. Such reliance on 
automated weather systems can be burdensome on the pilot and 
may affect the outcome of the flight. Beringer and Ball (2002) 
state that “NEXRAD has a number of limitations that most pilots 
do not take into account in their usage of the data” (p. 1). Beringer 
and Ball (2004) proceed to explain that:
NEXRAD data received in the cockpit are always 
time-delayed from the actual observation at least 6 
to 7 minutes following the actual radar scan.  This 
means that an image on a cockpit display may be as 
old as 12 to 14 minutes before it is updated. This fact 
gives rise to the legitimate concern that pilots might 
be trying to make tactical decisions based upon “old” 
data. There is also the question of how much degra-
dation is acceptable in the resolution of the data be-
fore pilots no longer feel that the displayed image is 
representative of the weather phenomena. (p. 1)
This report significantly supports the hypothesis of pi-
lots’ overreliance on weather displays, where both too much and 
too little use of these systems can have a negative effect on pilot 
performance and the overall safety of flight. A significant amount 
of training on weather automation, and the ability to fly without 
this automation, could exponentially decrease the number of acci-
dents and incidents that result from severe weather. Concurrently, 
a study by Latorella and Chamberlain (2001) examines General 
Aviation (GA) pilots’ use of aural, external, and sensor-based avi-
onics to make flight decisions. Latorella and Chamberlain (2001) 
identify “out-the-window,” Flight Service Station, Flightwatch, 
Air Traffic Control, Stormscope, and Strikefinder as the avionics 
used to determine the pilots’ in flight decision-making processes. 
In correlation to these weather systems, they note that  
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and, when weather becomes a problem, the frequen-
cies used to obtain this information become saturated, 
making this information inaccessible at exactly the 
time it is most needed… While these systems show 
severe local weather to avoid, they do not provide 
the more comprehensive weather picture required to 
fully support strategic planning or avoidance maneu-
vers. More accessible, complete, and usable weather 
information would benefit pilots’ situation aware-
ness, decision-making, and safety. (p. 1) 
The importance of the presence of weather automation, 
as well as pilot input pertaining to both strategic and tactical plan-
ning in hazardous conditions, is well documented. While weather 
automation does exhibit limitations to the amount and accuracy of 
data it provides, in high-risk situations the presence of these auto-
mated aids is more helpful than not. However, when the weather 
displays are most needed, the data may not be obtainable, which 
becomes a limitation to pilots. Furthermore, pilots should not rely 
solely on these systems under the assumption that when approach-
ing hazardous weather, the technology will always be available. 
Pilots must be trained to operate aircraft, independent of the au-
tomated weather systems. The skills required for tactical flight 
should be well ingrained into pilot training. If such skills exist for 
pilots operating in hazardous weather conditions, the level of risk 
and calamity associated with inclement weather can be mitigated.
Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) state that “weather-related 
crashes continue to account for a significant proportion of gen-
eral aviation (GA) accidents …Weather-related crashes are one 
of the most common causes of GA fatalities” (p. 305). In their 
study, Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) recruited forty pilots, separated 
by levels of experience, to be tested on decision-based scenarios, 
observing results with indication of information acquisition, per-
formance, decision-making, pilot experience (flight hours), and 
confidence. When examining the strategies of pilot information 
acquisition, it was determined that “experienced pilots accessed 
The Influence of Cockpit Weather Automation on Pilot Perception
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significantly fewer information screens, made fewer informa-
tion recursions and spent relatively less time examining the in-
formation screens than inexperienced pilots” (p. 316). Their data 
suggest that pilots with more experience rely less on automation 
when flying through hazardous weather, while less experienced 
pilots rely more heavily on automation to complete flight opera-
tions in hazardous weather. 
These results reflect the effects automation reliance 
has on pilots with lower confidence in performing. When pilots 
have low confidence in their ability to perform, they will rely 
more heavily on automation, which may not be the best choice. 
Inexperienced pilots might not trust automated systems to provide 
sufficient information pertaining to the surrounding environment; 
they might, however, rely on automation to guide them through 
inclement weather because of their uncertainty about their own 
ability to perform flight operations safely. Contrarily, more 
experienced pilots may be over-confident in their ability to 
perform operations with little to no automation, which in certain 
weather-related situations may not be the best decision.  However, 
less reliance upon automation may reflect a positive outcome, as 
the more experienced pilots take into account the limits of the 
systems and instead choose to apply their own experience in flight 
operations. 
A balance between the pilots’ confidence in their abilities 
to perform, their knowledge and training, and use of automation 
must exist to ensure overall flight safety in inclement or deterio-
rating weather conditions. Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) report that 
an “analysis of the decisions indicated that pilots in the intermedi-
ate and experienced groups were significantly more likely to con-
tinue toward their destinations than to divert. By contrast, pilots in 
the inexperienced group chose with greater frequency to return to 
the point of take-off” (p. 317). It is important to note that “the de-
cision to return to the point of departure, in most scenarios used, is 
ill-advised” (p. 317). Again, the more experienced pilots are more 
confident in both their own performance, as well as the uses of au-
tomation to complete flight operations, while the less experienced 
pilots are not as confident in their ability to complete flight opera-
Kryn M, Ambs
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tions.  This study supports the importance of accurate training and 
trust in automation to meet standard operation requirements, and 
the effects they can have on decreasing erroneous decision-mak-
ing, as well as accidents. Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) write that
A qualitative distinction was observed between 
both the information search and problem-solving 
strategies used by inexperienced and experienced 
pilots. This was interpreted as qualified support 
for the notion that through task-specific experi-
ence, individuals develop procedures that can be 
generalized and applied subsequently to a variety 
of situations. Quantitative differences were also 
observed between the information search strat-
egies of inexperienced and experienced pilots, 
with the former accessing a greater number of 
information screens; making a greater number of 
information recursions; and spending more time 
examining the information screens than the lat-
ter. Inexperienced pilots also exhibited greater re-
sponse latency in selecting from a forced choice: 
whether to continue to the destination or return to 
the point of take-off. (p. 318)
Additionally, the study by Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) 
addresses the importance and need for weather-related decision-
making in pilot training initiatives. “Weather-related decision-
making (WRDM) can be defined as those skills necessary to rec-
ognize and avoid meteorological phenomena that present a hazard 
to the flight” (p. 305). WRDM training could provide pilots with 
insight on how to take advantage of the weather automation re-
sources within the cockpit to make accurate decisions based on 
safety in a timely manner.
A study by Beringer and Schvaneveldt (2002), Priorities 
of Weather Information in Various Phases of Flight, reports that 71 
pilots (26 experienced, 45 novice) provided questionnaire respons-
es about weather related priorities at different phases of flight. The 
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phases of flight observed in the study include preflight planning, 
pre-departure, taxi, takeoff, climb, transition to cruise, cruise, in-
flight planning, descent, approach and landing (p. 87). Additionally, 
there were 28 weather factors that included, but were not limited to 
rain, hail, snow, turbulence, updrafts, downdrafts, lightning, winds-
hear, clouds, and static atmospheric pressure (p. 87). 
Beringer and Schvaneveldt (2002) asked pilots to rate 
certain factors between VFR and IFR flight, where “1 = criti-
cal and/or frequently accessed, 2 = important and/or usually 
accessed, 3 = relevant and/or sometimes accessed, and 4 = not 
relevant and/or rarely accessed” (p. 87). Data from this study 
indicate that experienced pilots rated weather information as more 
important than did the novice pilots. This study aimed to examine 
pilot use of weather automation in hazardous weather conditions; 
it reported that pilots with more training and flight experience uti-
lized the weather information provided by the automated weather 
systems, but also maintained a sense of necessity to perform flight 
operations and detect danger, independent of the weather displays. 
Beringer and Schvaneveldt (2002) add that, “for pilots to main-
tain (or quickly attain) good situation awareness, they must have 
access to and be aware of these critical information elements, 
whether they are actively in control or not” (p. 87). 
The Beringer and Schvaneveldt study identifies the 
positive effects of automated weather systems on pilot perception 
and decision-making in hazardous weather. Weather automation 
provides the pilot with crucial information in relation to the 
surrounding environment, quickly and efficiently, decreasing 
the time it takes pilots to identify hazards, make decisions, and 
perform the most optimal and safe flight operations.
In Relating Flight Experience and Pilots’ Perceptions of 
Decision-Making Skill, Goh and Wiegmann (2002b) report that
Recognizing the weather has changed does not im-
ply a pilot will generate the most optimal plan to 
deal with it. Being able to diagnose how serious this 
weather change is and the options available given 
the constraints of the situation (e.g., the weather 
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change precludes the option of returning to the ori-
gin), are highly important. Therefore, in the event 
that a pilot encounters situations that are not eas-
ily defined in emergency procedures (e.g., inadver-
tently encountering adverse weather), the pilot will 
need to rely on his or her own abilities to diagnose 
the problem quickly and accurately. (p. 84)
This study reinforces the importance of a pilot’s confi-
dence, and independence from weather automation, to perceive 
danger and act accordingly. While automated weather aids as-
sist pilots in identifying severe weather and route planning, the 
weather data are limited. Thus, it is important that pilots retain a 
crucial amount of skill, allowing for flight operations independent 
of automated weather displays. Such abilities will assist a pilot to, 
first, identify dangerous weather conditions, and then to act ac-
cordingly, with accuracy and speed.
Correlating to pilot decision-making in severe weather 
conditions, Krozel, Penny, Prete, and Mitchell (2007) examine 
the influence weather automation has on optimal planning 
in the transition airspace during weather related events. This 
study examined three automated route generators for weather 
avoidance: navigation aids (Navaids), flow-based route planners, 
and free-flights. The Navaids examined in this study were used 
to determine standard terminal arrival routes (STARs). The flow-
based route planners provide a set of routes that minimize the 
distance traveled. Free-flights are generated to avoid weather 
and separate other en-route aircraft, using the safest path within a 
two-hundred nautical mile range. They state that “compared with 
today’s routing practices, these methods demonstrate improved 
throughput with increased safety during hazardous weather events 
in the transition airspace” (Krozel et al., p. 152). This statement 
suggests the reliability and positive effects automated systems can 
have when aiming to avoid or fly through severe weather. Yet they 
note that   
Flow-based techniques are less computationally 
intensive, as a single synthesized route may apply 
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to many aircraft. A controlled version of free-flight 
(using required times of arrival for aircraft) can 
perform on par with the highest performing flow-
based techniques. However, free-flight requires 
routes to be generated for each aircraft that simul-
taneously avoid hazardous weather and aircraft 
conflicts, therefore requiring great computational 
time. Further, free-flight techniques exhibit greater 
complexity than flow-based techniques, and there-
fore imply greater workload to monitor. (p. 152)
While all three of these automated methods of severe 
weather avoidance provide safe and efficient routes within the air-
space, some methods are quicker and more efficient than others. 
Studies such as this are vitally important in determining the best 
form of weather automation systems to be implemented within the 
cockpit. As it is the industry’s goal to develop and implement the 
most proficient and accessible automation for flight operations, im-
proving the performance of both pilot and the automation will pro-
vide insight about the most appropriate automated weather systems. 
Madhavan and Lacson (2006) discuss the effects of auto-
mation on pilot decision-making in their study “Psychological Fac-
tors Affecting Pilots’ Decision to Navigate in Deteriorating Weath-
er.” This study identifies the influences of automated systems on 
pilot decision-making in high-risk situations. These technologies 
improve, speed up, and at times fully complete flight operations 
and decision-making situations for pilots. It is reported that
Higher levels of automation may be beneficial 
in situations where it is extremely difficult or 
even impossible for the pilot to independently as-
sess the overall state of the system (in this case 
the aircraft in critically deteriorating weather 
conditions)… These automated systems assist, 
support or even perform the last stages of deci-
sion-making for the pilot, namely functions as-
Kryn M, Ambs
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sociated with risk assessment, decision-making 
and action selection… Decision-making mod-
els can help determine the causes of VFR into 
IMC incidents by delineating the variables that 
typically affect quality of decisions at various 
stages of the navigating process.  Consequently, 
solutions to improve pilot decision-making can 
be found through cognitive aspects of training, 
displays allow for easy detection and integra-
tion of cues, as well as automated tools to as-
sess and formulate courses of action. (p. 58-59)
This study shows that automated decision-making yields 
difficulties in determining probable causes in aviation accidents, 
supports pilots in making decisions, and at times completes flight 
operations for the pilot, providing pilots with information pertain-
ing to flight operations, and in some cases preventing aircraft ac-
cidents by decreasing the time needed in the decision-making pro-
cess. Such yields are most beneficial in high-risk situations with 
an absolute need for automated weather aids.
CONCLUSION
Too much or too little attention given to automated 
weather aids may prevent a pilot from recognizing the severity of 
weather conditions and choosing the best response to the situation. 
This research concludes that the influence of weather automation 
on pilot perception and decision-making, whether it is positive 
or negative, is significantly dependent upon the pilot’s training 
and flight experience. For the best performance and completion of 
cognitive tasks in severe weather, there must be a balance between 
a pilot’s knowledge of flight operations, ability to complete flight 
operations and a pilot’s reliance upon weather automation. Safer 
decision-making and high performance between pilots and auto-
mated weather systems will help reduce erroneous behavior and, 
ultimately, aircraft accidents. 
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